EA - The Brussels Effect and AI: How EU AI regulation will impact the global AI market by MarkusAnderljung
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Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Brussels Effect and AI: How EU AI regulation will impact the global AI market, published by MarkusAnderljung on August 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. We just published a ~90-page report called The Brussels Effect and AI: How EU regulation will impact the global AI market. This post is a supplement to our report, where we speculate on topics and draw out implications outside the report’s scope. We’ll provide a very brief summary of the report, discuss why the potential of a Brussels Effect might matter, whether a strong Brussels Effect in AI is desirable, and list some suggestions for potential follow-on work. What does the report do? The report aims to answer the question of whether EU AI regulation will have impacts on AI systems being deployed outside the EU, even though the regulation only applies to systems in the EU (i.e. whether the regulation will produce a “Brussels Effect”). The impacts might be produced either via companies voluntarily complying outside the EU (a de facto Brussels Effect) or via other jurisdictions adopting EU-esque regulation (a de jure Brussels Effect). We conclude there will be at least a partial Brussels Effect. Here’s the abstract: “The European Union is likely to introduce among the first, most stringent, and most comprehensive AI regulatory regimes of the world’s major jurisdictions. In this report, we ask whether the EU’s upcoming regulation for AI will diffuse globally, producing a so-called “Brussels Effect”. Building on and extending Anu Bradford’s work, we outline the mechanisms by which such regulatory diffusion may occur. We consider both the possibility that the EU’s AI regulation will incentivise changes in products offered in non-EU countries (a de facto Brussels Effect) and the possibility it will influence regulation adopted by other jurisdictions (a de jure Brussels Effect). Focusing on the proposed EU AI Act, we tentatively conclude that both de facto and de jure Brussels effects are likely for parts of the EU regulatory regime. A de facto effect is particularly likely to arise in large US tech companies with AI systems that the AI Act terms “high-risk”. We argue that the upcoming regulation might be particularly important in offering the first and most influential operationalisation of what it means to develop and deploy trustworthy or human-centred AI. If the EU regime is likely to see significant diffusion, ensuring it is well-designed becomes a matter of global importance.” The report also includes a summary of current and forthcoming AI-relevant regulation in the EU (e.g. the AI Act) as well as a table summarizing our conclusions. Why might this work matter? A stronger Brussels Effect increases the value of affecting EU AI regulation One of our primary motivations for this work was to better understand the value of AI policy work in the EU to address risks from advanced AI. A particularly important argument in favor of such work being valuable seemed to be (see e.g. Stefan Torges’ How Europe might matter for AI governance and Nicolas’ Should you work in the European Union to do AGI governance?): The EU regulatory regime will impact advanced AI outcomes, at least in the jurisdictions it affects. It is possible to influence EU AI regulation to produce better impacts from advanced AI systems, at least in the jurisdictions it affects. EU regulation of AI will diffuse globally via the Brussels Effect. If 1, 2, and 3 hold, then people interested in shaping AI’s impact on the world should try to positively affect the regulation. Therefore, people interested in shaping AI’s impact on the world should try to positively affect the regulation. We thought premises 1, 2, and 4 seemed likely to be true, but were unsure about 3, motivating the report. Briefly on the other premises: Premise 1 seemed likely because t...
